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THE ARKANSAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
Susan Webber Wright**
Following is Chapter V of a multichapter short treatise on the
Arkansas law of oil and gas. Other chapters appear in Volumes 9 and
10 of UALR Law Journal.*** This treatise is not intended as an in-
depth analysis, but rather as a description of the current state law
which, the author hopes, will be helpful to those not regularly en-
gaged in the oil and gas law practice.
CHAPTER V
IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
This chapter focuses on the development of the Arkansas law of
implied covenants in oil and gas leases by discussing court decisions
on the offset well covenant and the development covenant. As to each
covenant, this chapter includes the elements of the covenant, what
constitutes a breach, whether the lessee must give notice of the breach
as a prerequisite to bringing suit, and the proper remedies.
The topic of this chapter was the subject of a book by the late
Professor Maurice Merrill of the University of Oklahoma Law
Center.' It is also the subject of numerous other scholarly efforts.2
A. The Offset Well Covenant
This covenant, also known as the covenant to protect against
drainage, arises, as do other implied covenants, from the conflict of
* All rights reserved by author. Material is subject to author's copyright.
** Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. The author
acknowledges and thanks Paula Williams, class of 1987, who helped in the research for this
project.
*** Chapters I and II concern the Nature of Oil and Gas Interests and Multiple Owner-
ship of Oil and Gas Interests and appear at 9 UALR L.J. 223 (1986-87). Chapter III is on
Conveyances of Oil and Gas Interests by Deed and appears at 9 UALR L.J. 467 (1986-87).
Chapter IV considers the Oil and Gas Lease and appears at 10 UALR L.J. 5 (1987-88).
1. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940). Of
course, Professor Merrill's treatise is not confined to the law of a particular jurisdiction.
2. E.g., Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market
under Mineral Leases, 27 S.W. LEGAL FOUND. OIL & GAS INST. 177 (1976); Vander Ploeg,
The Implied Covenant of Reasonable Development-A Delicate Balance, 3 E. MIN. L. INST. 18-
1 (1982); Williams, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Some General Principles, 29 U.
KAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
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interest between the lessor and lessee.3 The fugacious character of oil
and gas permits a well located on one landowner's property to with-
draw oil and gas from a common pool, thereby taking oil or gas, or
both, from the land of neighboring property owners. The rule of cap-
ture permits this,4 and the obvious solution for any landowner in this
predicament is to drill his own well to produce minerals from the
common pool.5 However, if the landowner has executed an oil and
gas lease to the property, he has conveyed the right to drill a well to
his lessee. The lessee might not be disposed to drilling a well, either
because he has an interest in the draining well or because he does not
believe that an offset well 6 would be profitable. On the other hand,
the lessor, whose royalty is paid from production without deduction
for expenses, receives royalty despite the profitability or unprofitabil-
ity of a well. Therefore, an offset well would be in the best interest of
the lessor, but not necessarily in the best interest of the lessee.
In the foregoing situation the lease governs the rights between
the lessor and lessee. If the lease has a specific provision governing
the drilling of offset or protection wells, that provision might be en-
forced,7 at least if the lessee is not responsible for the drainage.'
Leases usually do not provide for this situation, but as shown below,
the courts have found an implied covenant on the part of the lessee to
protect the premises from drainage. The covenant is not breached by
drainage alone. The lessor must prove breach by establishing that the
drainage from his property is substantial and that an offset well would
be profitable to the lessee.' Thus, the lessee is bound by the "prudent
3. See M. MERRILL, supra note 1, at 15-19, for a discussion of the inherent conflicts of
interest between the parties to an oil and gas lease.
4. The rule of capture is discussed in Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chapter
I), 9 UALR L.J. 223, 230 (1986-87).
5. The common law permitted this, but today well spacing rules and forced pooling
might prevent a landowner from taking this action. The law of pooling is the subject of a
subsequent chapter.
6. An offset well is defined as "[a] well drilled on one tract of land to prevent the drain-
age of oil or gas to an adjoining tract of land, on which a well is being drilled or is already in
production." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 568 (6th ed.
1984).
7. Eg., Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950).
8. However, if the plaintiff's lessee is responsible for the drainage a specific offset well
covenant might not be enforced. Eg., Williams v. Humble Oil and Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th
Cir. 1970), reh'g denied, 435 F.2d 772 (1971); Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.
1966).
9. In Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. v. Pierson, 84 F.2d 468, 471 (8th Cir. 1935) (quoting
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905)), the court explained why the
law does not require the lessee to proceed if a well will not be profitable. See 5 H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 822 (1986) and cases cited. Profitability to the lessee means
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operator" standard, which governs other implied lease obligations as
well. 'o
If the lessee is responsible for drainage from the lessor's property,
some jurisdictions do not apply the prudent operator rule and hold
the lessee liable for breach of the implied offset well covenant even if
the lessor cannot prove that an offset well would be profitable.II Ar-
kansas has never recognized this exception to application of the pru-
dent operator rule. In Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. 12 the
Arkansas Supreme Court applied a standard tantamount to the pru-
dent operator standard to a situation in which the lessee was operat-
ing the draining well:
The practical test is to be found in the question, are the outside
wells, as for example, the wells on the Grieg and Bryant tracts,
draining the [plaintiff's] land to such an extent that, if the wells on
the Grieg and Bryant tracts were operated by a third party, appel-
lee as lessee of the [plaintiff's] tract, would find it good manage-
ment to put down protection wells to save its own leased territory
from exhaustion? 3
Thus, in Arkansas the lessee is held to a uniform standard which
is not affected by whether the lessee is the party responsible for the
drainage. Authorities differ concerning whether this is the better rule.
Williams and Meyers take the position that the Arkansas approach is
preferable because it preserves the requirement of profitability of an
offset well.4 However, there is a persuasive argument that when the
lessee is operating the draining well, he should be liable, perhaps on
the basis of another implied covenant, one "to refrain from activities
that would injure [the lessor's] interest."'" It seems that the latter
that the lessee should be able to recover a profit after drilling and operating expenses. See, e.g.,
Gerson v. Anderson-Pritchard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945). This measure of
profitability is not the same as the test for determining whether there is production in "paying
quantities" sufficient to keep the lease alive under the habendum clause. See, e.g., Clifton v.
Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959), in which the court considered only costs of
production (or lifting costs) to determine whether a well was producing in paying quantities
for purposes of the habendum clause.
10. See R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.5, at 430 (2d ed. 1983); 5 H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, § 806.3.
11. E.g., Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1977).
12. 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921).
13. Id. at 309, 230 S.W. at 288.
14. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, § 824.2, suggests that where the lessee is
responsible for the drainage the burden of persuasion of profitability of an offset well should be
on the lessee.
15. Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 1977). Other decisions
adopting this type of covenant include R.R. Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945); Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d
1987-88]
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approach is a better one, as it encourages the lessee to treat the lessor
fairly by drilling on the lease, pooling the lease with the site of the
producing well, or paying compensatory royalties to the lessor for oil
or gas that is being drained from the lease.
Some of the Arkansas decisions on the implied covenant to pro-
tect against drainage confront the effect of delay rentals upon the cov-
enant. In the Blair decision the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that
delay rentals should not affect the lessee's obligations under the
covenant:
For the rental reserved, [the lessor] is neither selling his oil or gas,
nor relinquishing his ownership thereof, nor consenting to sever-
ance or abstraction thereof. He expects it to remain in the land
until the rental period ends, whether it ceases by the drilling of a
well or expiration of the term. Nor can it be doubted that the
lessee contemplated the same result. Neither could have intended
that he should take out the mineral through wells on other lands. 16
In Blair the lessee was successful in his suit to have the lease
forfeited and to recover damages for the royalty value of the gas
drained from the lease."
In two subsequent decisions the Arkansas Supreme Court inter-
preted its holding in Blair as to the effect of delay rentals upon the
implied covenant to protect against drainage. In Clear Creek Oil &
Gas Co. v. Brunk,"8 the lessor made demand upon the lessee to drill
protection wells because the lessee was draining the lessor's property
with wells on adjacent land. The lessee then tendered, and the lessor
accepted, increased delay rentals "until [the lessee] could drill a
well." 9 The lessee never drilled a well, but continued to pay delay
rentals (which the lessor continued to accept) until the lessee surren-
dered the lease. The lessor then sued for damages. The court held for
the lessee, reasoning that the lessor's acceptance of increased delay
rentals after the alleged breach of the covenant barred the lessor from
344 (1950). See Seed, The Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to Refrain from Depletory
Acts, 3 UCLA L. REv. 508 (1955-56), for the position that there is a separate "depletory
covenant." See Williams, Implied Covenants' Threat to the Value of Oil and Gas Reserves, 36
S.W. LEGAL FOUND. OIL & GAS INST. 3-1 (1985), for the view that this covenant might not
be recognized by Texas despite the decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 410 S.W.2d 187
(Tex. 1966).
16. 148 Ark. at 309, 230 S.W. at 289 (quoting Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va.
433, 439, 89 S.E. 12, 15 (1916)).
17. Id. at 311, 230 S.W. at 290.
18. 160 Ark. 574, 255 S.W. 7 (1923).
19. Id. at 577, 255 S.W. at 7.
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a suit for damages. 20 The court noted that in Blair the lessor had
refused to accept delay rentals and had immediately declared a forfei-
ture upon learning of the breach. 21 The court reasoned that it logi-
cally follows from the Blair decision that the lessor waives the breach
when he consents to further delay by accepting payment for it. 22
In Carson v. Ozark Natural Gas Co.,23 the lessor made demand
on the lessee, which was draining the lessor's gas through wells on
adjacent land, to drill protection wells. The lessor accepted increased
delay rentals in lieu of drilling for one year, but refused to accept
increased rentals the following year and again demanded that the
lessee drill an offset well. The lessee executed a release of the lease,
and the lessor sued for damages for breach of the implied covenant for
protection against drainage. Citing the holding in Brunk, the court
held that the lessor could not recover damages for the period for
which he had accepted increased rentals. However, the court found
that the release was ineffective because the lessee had laid pipeline on
the property in accordance with the terms of the lease. Thus, the
lessor was entitled to damages for breach of the implied covenant.24
The Carson case arguably indicated that a lessee could cancel or
release the lease prior to the end of the primary term and thereby
avoid liability for breach of the implied covenant to protect against
drainage. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Arkansas Natural
Gas Corp. v. Pierson,25 held that a lessee could not so easily escape
liability. In that case the lessor alleged that the lessee was draining
gas from the leasehold through nearby wells, demanded that the
lessee drill an offset well, and refused to accept delay rental pay-
ments.26 The lessee, without informing the lessor, filed a release of the
lease and maintained that, in any event, the lease terminated when the
lessor refused the delay rentals.2 The court held for the lessor, af-
firming the lower court in awarding damages based upon the royalty
value of the gas drained from the plaintiff's property. The court rea-
soned that the implied covenant is for the benefit of the lessor, that the
20. Id. at 579, 255 S.W. at 8.
21. Id. at 578, 255 S.W. at 8.
22. Id. at 579, 255 S.W. at 8.
23. 191 Ark. 167, 83 S.W.2d 833 (1935).
24. Id. at 171, 83 S.W.2d at 835. The lease provided for a fixed royalty of $200 per year
for each gas well. The lessor's counsel had agreed that one well would have sufficed under the
lease, so the plaintiff's damages equaled $200 per year.
25. 84 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1936).
26. It seems that perhaps the lessor or his counsel was aware of the holding in Clear
Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, 255 S.W. 7 (1923).
27. 84 F.2d at 472.
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breach of the covenant does not automatically result in forfeiture of
the lease, and that the lessor may chose to enforce the lease and sue
for breach of the covenant.28 However, the court allowed damages
only for the duration of the primary term on grounds that the haben-
dum clause of the lease relates "to gas produced by reason of the de-
velopment of the leasehold under the lease." 2 9 The lower court had
awarded the lessor damages beyond expiration of the primary term,
reasoning that the drainage was continuing and that the lease would
continue "as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them is pro-
duced from said land by the lessee."30 Although the lower court's
holding might have appeal for a victimized lessor, the approach by the
appellate court, limiting the damages to the primary term, would gen-
erally allow the lessor time to find another operator willing to drill.3'
There are cases from other jurisdictions which have found breach
of the implied covenant against drainage in situations in which the
lessee, as a prudent operator, would not have drilled an offset well but
would have taken some other action, such as pooling the lease3 2 or
applying for well spacing exceptions33 or for compulsory pooling.34
These decisions seem sound, as they consistently require that the
lessee act as a reasonably prudent operator.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has never discussed whether a
lessee can be liable for breach of the covenant from failure to take
action other than drilling an offset well. However, in Amoco Produc-
tion Co. v. Ware3" the lessor alleged that the lessee had permitted
drainage from the leasehold, had wrongfully failed to appeal an Oil
and Gas Commission order unitizing the lease with adjacent property,
and had entered into a field-wide unitization agreement which diluted
the lessor's royalty interest. The supreme court refused to affirm the
chancellor's finding that drainage had occurred36 and held that the
lessee had acted prudently.37 Because the court did not find that
28. Id.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id.
31. It is assumed that the lessor could find an operator willing to drill, because an offset
well would be profitable; otherwise, there would be no breach of the covenant.
32. E.g., Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165, reh'g denied, 435 F.2d 772
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971). See Pierce v. Goldking Properties, Inc., 396
So. 2d 528, 532, writ denied, 400 So. 2d 904 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (placing land in unit satisfied
obligation to protect from drainage).
33. E.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
34. E.g., U.V. Indus., Inc. v. Danielson, 184 Mont. 203, 602 P.2d 571 (1979).
35. 269 Ark. 313, 602 S.W.2d 620 (1980).
36. Id. at 322, 602 S.W.2d at 624.
37. Id. at 323, 602 S.W.2d at 625.
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drainage had occurred, the decision leaves open the question whether
the covenant against drainage may be breached by the lessee's action
(or inaction) before the Oil and Gas Commission and in the courts.
However, the court pointed out that the lessor himself could have
appealed the decision of the Commission, 8 perhaps indicating that
there would have been no breach of the covenant even if the lessor
had established drainage.
In summary, the Arkansas cases on breach of the offset well cov-
enant indicate that a lessor should not accept delay rental payments
after he learns of a breach of the covenant. In the event of breach, the
cases allow the lessor to obtain cancellation of the lease and to recover
damages based upon the amount of drainage. However, the Arkansas
law apparently does not permit a lessee to avoid liability for damages
during the primary term by releasing the lease or by claiming that the
lease has been terminated by the lessor's refusal to accept rentals. Ar-
kansas has not yet decided that the offset well covenant might require
the lessee, as a prudent operator, to seek administrative relief or to
take action other than to drill an offset well.
B. The Covenant for Reasonable Development
This covenant, like the offset well covenant, requires the lessee to
develop the lease with the diligence of a prudent operator. Arkansas
has recognized this covenant in many cases, most of which are dis-
cussed herein. The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated on numerous
occasions that this implied covenant exists when the principal consid-
eration for the lease is royalties.39 Thus the covenant seems to be one
implied in fact, that is, implied from the parties' agreement and re-
flecting their intent that the lessee develop the premises with due dili-
gence." Breach ordinarily occurs after the lessee has produced oil or
gas but has not proceeded diligently with further development.4'
38. Id. at 321, 602 S.W.2d at 624. The court cited ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-120 (1971)
(currently codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-110 (1987)).
39. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 566, 331 S.W.2d 112 (1960); Smart v. Crow,
220 Ark. 141, 246 S.W.2d 432 (1952); Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d
1015 (1930); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Parkhill, 114 Ark. 419, 169 S.W. 957 (1914).
40. Whether covenants are implied in fact or implied in law has not been discussed di-
rectly by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Covenants implied in fact are those which the parties
actually intend, while those implied in law arise from the relationship of the parties. The late
Maurice Merrill contended that lease covenants are implied in law. M. MERRILL, supra note
1, § 220. For a view that they are implied in fact, see Walker, The Nature of the Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV. 399, 402-06 (1933). For
the significance of the distinction, see H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL, C. MEYERS, & S. WIL-
LIAMS, OIL AND GAS, CASES AND MATERIALS 491 (5th ed. 1986).
41. E.g., Stevenson v. Barnes, 288 Ark. 147, 702 S.W.2d 787 (1986); Byrd v. Bradham,
1987-88]
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1. Effect of Delay Rental Payments
Delay rental payments permit the lessee to postpone develop-
ment during the primary term. Therefore, a lessor should not be able
to establish breach of the covenant for reasonable development during
the primary term when the lease provides for payment of delay rentals
and rentals are tendered by the lessee.42 However, in the Arkansas
Supreme Court decision Poindexter v. Lion Oil Refining Co. ,43 the les-
sor prevailed in a suit for breach of the covenant when he had rejected
delay rentals tendered by the lessee. The court found that the lessee
was obligated to develop the lease, pointing out the lower court's find-
ing that the wells on adjacent tracts had " 'a tendency to drain oil
from under the lands involved in this suit."'" Perhaps this decision
is actually based upon the implied covenant to protect against drain-
age, but in reaching its conclusion, the court relied on earlier deci-
sions applying the implied covenant for reasonable development.45
2. Elements of Breach
At the heart of the implied covenant for reasonable development
is the intent of the parties that the lessee develop the lease as a pru-
dent operator. The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized this cove-
nant as early as 1911 in the decision Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander:4 6
And the general rule for the construction of mineral leases, such as
is involved in this case, is that the law implies a covenant upon the
part of the lessee to make the exploration and search for the miner-
als in a proper manner and with reasonable diligence and to work
the mine or well when the mineral is discovered, so that the lessor
may obtain the compensation which both parties must have had in
contemplation when the agreement was entered into.47
280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983); Nolan v. Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958).
However, at least one older Arkansas case applied the covenant in absence of prior develop-
ment when the lease contained no delay rental clause. See Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97
Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
42. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, § 832. One Arkansas decision ex-
pressly pointed out that the lessor's acceptance of delay rentals precluded a cause of action for
breach of the implied development covenant. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 161
Ark. 26, 255 S.W. 37 (1923).
43. 205 Ark. 978, 167 S.W.2d 492 (1943).
44. Id. at 987, 167 S.W.2d at 497.
45. Id. at 984-87, 167 S.W.2d at 495-97. These decisions include Smith v. Moody, 192
Ark. 704, 94 S.W.2d 357 (1936); Standard Oil Co. v. Giller, 183 Ark. 776, 38 S.W.2d 766
(1931); Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930).
46. 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
47. Id. at 171, 133 S.W. at 838-39.
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The court in Mansfield had no difficulty finding that the covenant was
part of the lease, as the lessor's only compensation, other than a nomi-
nal sum of one dollar recited in the lease, was the royalties payable
out of production. 48 The court cancelled the lease because the lessee,
which had developed surrounding property, refused to develop the
plaintiff's leasehold for eight years. The primary term of the lease
was fifty years and there was no provision for payment of delay rent-
als. Had the court decided for the lessee, the lessor's property might
have been subject to the lease for fifty years, during which time the
lessee might not have developed it and the lessor would have been
unable to develop it himself or lease it to another.
Apparently the foundation of the covenant is the parties' intent
at the time the lease was executed. 49 For example, in the federal court
decision Wood v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. ,50 the court held that the les-
sor had not established that the lessee breached the prudent operator
standard by failing to explore horizons deeper than the Nacatoch
sand, from which there was production. At the time the lease was
executed, the Nacatoch sand was the only known producing forma-
tion, and the court reasoned that "[a] covenant should not be implied
... to meet a situation that was not in the minds of either the lessor or
lessee at the time the lease was executed."5  A later Arkansas
Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v. Smith,5 2 similarly held that the
lessee had not violated the prudent operator standard in failing to drill
below the Travis Peak formation, which was the formation the parties
had in mind at the time of the lease. The court pointed out that since
that time new information had indicated that there might be deeper
producing formations, but that the evidence indicated that a prudent
operator would not drill to the deeper horizons without additional
acreage. 3
In many cases the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the
covenant of development extends to the entire leased premises.5 4 In
most cases involving this covenant the lessor alleges breach after the
lessee has drilled at least one producing well and fails to develop and
explore additional lease acreage, claiming that the entire lease is held
48. Id. at 169, 133 S.W. at 838.
49. In this respect the covenant in Arkansas is probably implied in fact (as opposed to in
law). See supra note 40.
50. 40 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. Ark. 1941).
51. Id. at 46.
52. 231 Ark. 566, 331 S.W.2d 112 (1960).
53. Id. at 571, 331 S.W.2d at 116.
54. E.g., Enstar Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co., 294 Ark. 77, 740 S.W.2d 630 (1987); Byrd v.
Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
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by production. For example, in Drummond v. Alphin 11 one lease cov-
ered a total of 1947 acres on twenty-seven scattered tracts, and an-
other lease covered 1710 acres on thirty-one different tracts. There
was one producing well on each lease, and the lessees and their assign-
ees claimed that the leases were held by production under the lease
terms.16 The court affirmed the lower court in cancelling the portions
of the leases which had not been explored.5 7 Likewise, the court can-
celled all of the lease except ten acres surrounding a producing well in
Ezzell v. Oil Associates, Inc." In that case the lessee drilled two wells,
one a dry hole and the other a producer, on an 1170-acre leasehold
and claimed to hold the lease by production without further explora-
tion. The last well was completed in 1922, the primary term of the
lease expired in 1924, and the lessor brought suit to cancel in 1928,
after unsuccessfully demanding that the lessee drill additional wells.
The court described the nature of the covenant as follows:
So it may be taken, as the well-settled rule in this State, that there
is an implied covenant on the part of the lessee in oil and gas leases
to proceed with reasonable diligence in the search for oil and gas,
and also to continue the search with reasonable diligence, to the
end that oil and gas may be produced in paying quantities through-
out the whole of the leased premises.5 9
The court applied this principle in the 1960 decision Skelly Oil Co. v.
Scoggins," cancelling the lease as to 280 acres which the lessee had
not developed in the thirteen years of the existence of the lease,
although the lessee had developed forty acres. The court again found
breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development in the 1983
decision Byrd v. Bradham,61 cancelling seventy-five acres of an eighty-
acre lease which the lessee had failed to develop for twenty-eight
years.
55. 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S.W.2d 942 (1928).
56. The leases contained the following unusual clause which does not appear in a typical
modem lease:
In case [lessee] should bore and discover either oil or gas, then in that event this
grant, incumbrance or conveyance shall be in full force and effect for twenty-five
years from the time of the discovery of said product, and as much longer as oil or gas
may be produced in paying quantities thereon.
Id. at 1055, 4 S.W.2d at 942. The court held that despite this clause, the lessee was obligated
to continue operations following discovery of oil during the 25-year term. Id.
57. Id. at 1061, 4 S.W.2d at 945.
58. 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930).
59. Id. at 810, 22 S.W.2d at 1018 (emphasis added).
60. 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1960).
61. 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
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However, in a 1986 decision, Stevenson v. Barnes,62 a majority of
the Arkansas Supreme Court did not require that the lessee develop
the entire leased premises when evidence indicated that two produc-
ing wells on the 120-acre lease would eventually produce all of the oil
available from the lease because one well was high on the producing
structure. 63 The lessee contended that he should be permitted to hold
the undeveloped portions of the lease because additional wells drilled
by another lessee would deprive him of recoverable oil.' However,
two dissenting justices took the position that each of the existing wells
could drain no more than ten acres and that the lessee was in violation
of the covenant to develop with due diligence. 65 The dissent also took
the position that even if the existing wells could recover all of the
available oil, the lessee would be depriving the lessor of "a receipt of
her royalties over an unreasonable period of time."'66
The Arkansas Supreme Court has not been hesitant to apply the
covenant to a small lease or to a situation in which there has already
been substantial development. For example, in Standard Oil Co. v.
Giller,67 the court cancelled the undeveloped portion of the forty-acre
lease, preserving the lease as to ten acres drained by a producing
well. 68 An example of a situation in which the court required more
development of a lessee who had already undertaken extensive devel-
opment is found in the 1952 decision Smart v. Crow. 69 In that case
the lessees had drilled twelve producing wells on a 150-acre leasehold,
but the lessor sued to cancel the lease as to four ten-acre tracts on
grounds that one well drained only ten acres. The supreme court af-
firmed the chancellor's finding that the development was reasonable
as to two of the four tracts, but that the lessees would be required to
develop the other two tracts within a prescribed period of time.7 °
Determining what a prudent operator would do under the cir-
cumstances can be a matter of debate. But a recent Arkansas
Supreme Court decision indicates that a lessee probably violates that
standard when he chooses not to drill on the basis of the same infor-
mation which leads another operator to drill successfully. Enstar
62. 288 Ark. 147, 702 S.W.2d 787 (1986).
63. Id. at 148, 702 S.W.2d at 788.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151, 702 S.W.2d at 789 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 152, 702 S.W.2d at 790 (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
67. 183 Ark. 776, 38 S.W.2d 766 (1931).
68. Id. at 779, 38 S.W.2d at 767.
69. 220 Ark. 141, 246 S.W.2d 432 (1952).
70. Id. at 144, 246 S.W.2d at 434.
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Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co.7 involved a leasehold of 241 acres, part of
which had been unitized in 1949. The lessee drilled one well which
stopped producing in 1952 on a nonunitized eighty-acre tract of the
leasehold. The lessee had not drilled or otherwise developed this tract
when the lessor executed a second lease to this tract in 1974 to Crystal
Oil Company, which drilled one producing well in 1976 and another
in 1978. The trial judge found that the initial lessee had "abandoned"
the lease on this tract and had breached the implied covenant to de-
velop. The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that the appellant had
violated the prudent operator standard, as evidenced by Crystal's suc-
cessful wells, which Crystal had decided to drill after studying the
appellant's wells logs. 72 In this regard the court distinguished its
holding in Saulsberry v. Siegel,73 in which the lessee was able to retain
a lease after several years of nondevelopment even though a subse-
quent lessee drilled a producing well. The court in that case pointed
out that there was no evidence on why the subsequent lessee decided
to drill but that there was evidence supporting the first lessee's deci-
sion not to drill.
In Enstar the court was not persuaded by the appellant's argu-
ment that the price of oil between 1952 and 1974 was too low to jus-
tify additional drilling, pointing out that the appellant did not
evidence any intent to drill after 1974 and did not even bring suit to
protect its lease until five years after Crystal had completed its first
producing well.74
One can infer from the foregoing decisions that a lessee may not
hold a lease for purposes of speculation for an unreasonable period of
time without breaching the development covenant. A lessee might
argue that it is "prudent" to hold a lease without further development
under some circumstances, but such a position is contrary to the pru-
dent operator standard, which requires the lessee to act in the best
interest of both the lessee and the lessor. 75 This standard requires that
the lessee "must not consider his own interest wholly or for the most
71. 294 Ark. 77, 740 S.W.2d 630 (1987).
72. Id. at 80-81, 740 S.W.2d at 632.
73. 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (1952).
74. 294 Ark. at 81, 740 S.W.2d at 632.
75. See, e.g., Enstar Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co., 294 Ark. 77, 80, 740 S.W.2d 630, 631
(1987); Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 14, 655 S.W.2d 366, 367 (1986); Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Ware, 269 Ark. 313, 319, 602 S.W.2d 620, 623 (1980); Smart v. Crow, 220 Ark. 141, 143, 246
S.W.2d 432, 434 (1952); Poindexter v. Lion Oil Ref. Co., 205 Ark. 978, 985, 167 S.W.2d 492,
496 (1943); Standard Oil Co. v. Giller, 183 Ark. 776, 778, 38 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1931); Ezzell v.
Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 811, 22 S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (1930).
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part."' 76 In the 1958 decision Nolan v. Thomas17 the court was ex-
plicit in finding that the lessee may not hold undeveloped portions of
the lease indefinitely, quoting from the United States Supreme Court
decision Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. :78
The production of oil on a small portion of the leased tract cannot
justify the lessee's holding the balance indefinitely and depriving
the lessor, not only of the expected royalty from production pursu-
ant to the lease, but of the privilege of making some other arrange-
ment for availing himself of the mineral content of the lands.79
Similarly, a lessee might argue that there can be no breach of the
development covenant in absence of the lessor's proving that addi-
tional wells would be profitable."0 The Arkansas Supreme Court, in
applying the prudent operator standard, has never required the lessor
to prove that additional wells would be profitable. In Smith v.
Moody8 the court held that the contention of the lessee that addi-
tional wells would be unprofitable "may be disposed of by saying that,
if true, the lessees have not been damaged by the cancellation of so
much of the contract of lease as cannot be profitably performed."82
The court cited this decision in 1959 in Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins,83
pointing out that a lessee should not complain of cancellation of a
lease which cannot be profitably developed. 4
Similarly, in the 1983 decision Byrd v. Bradham,85 the Arkansas
Supreme Court found breach of the implied development covenant
and granted the lessor cancellation of the undeveloped portion of the
lease despite the lessee's contention that she had no obligation to de-
velop the remaining acreage because the area was a "wildcat" area
76. Poindexter v. Lion Oil Ref. Co., 205 Ark. 978, 985, 167 S.W.2d 492, 496 (1943);
Ezzell v. Oil Assocs., Inc., 180 Ark. 802, 811, 22 S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (1930).
77. 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958).
78. 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
79. 228 Ark. at 578, 309 S.W.2d at 731 (quoting 292 U.S. at 281).
80. In some jurisdictions the lessor must establish that additional wells would be profita-
ble. See infra note 91. One noted oil and gas scholar, Judge Stephen Williams, would apply a
"modified" profitability test, requiring that development not only be profitable but that it be
more profitable to develop at the present rather than at a future time. Williams, Implied Cove-
nants for Development and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases-The Determination of Profit-
ability, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 443 (1979).
81. 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W.2d 357 (1936).
82. Id. at 707, 94 S.W.2d at 358. See also Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 14, 655 S.W.2d
366, 367 (1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1960); Nolan v.
Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 577, 309 S.W.2d 727, 730 (1958).
83. 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959).
84. Id. at 359, 329 S.W.2d at 426.
85. 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
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and any well drilled would be a gamble.16 As to this contention, the
court wrote that "if there is nothing for [the lessee] to gain, then she
has lost nothing by cancellation of the lease."8 " One can take issue
with the court's reasoning that the lessee had nothing to lose, for the
court seems to be taking the position that the speculative value of a
leasehold of unknown producing potential is worth nothing, a premise
which defies economic reality. 8 Nevertheless, the result of the case
may be justified on another ground: the court held that twenty-eight
years without development was too long and cancelled the lease on
the undeveloped acreage, following its previous holdings to the effect
that the lessee may not "hold the entire leasehold indefinitely"
through production on only a small part of the lease.8 9
From the foregoing decisions one can conclude that the prudent
operator standard in Arkansas does not permit a lessee to hold unde-
veloped portions of a lease indefinitely, even in absence of proof that
additional wells are likely to be profitable. This version of the prudent
operator standard is harsher on the lessee than the rule recognized in
some other jurisdictions which requires that the lessor prove that ad-
ditional development would probably be profitable to the lessee. 90
In Arkansas it is not always necessary that the lessor make de-
mand that the lessee drill additional wells in order to obtain cancella-
tion for breach of the development covenant. For example, in Byrd v.
Bradham 9 the court granted cancellation despite the lack of such de-
mand, citing as precedent a 1914 decision, Mansfield Gas Co. v. Park-
hill,9 2 in which the lessor had made no demand for performance but
was successful in the suit to cancel the lease on grounds that the lessee
had been inactive for ten years.
3. Remedies
Remedies for breach of the implied development covenant in Ar-
kansas include cancellation, partial cancellation, and conditional can-
cellation of the lease. Courts in other jurisdictions have on occasion
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. In Texas a mineral owner recovered for the loss of his property's speculative value.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 299 S.W. 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
89. 280 Ark. at 14, 655 S.W.2d at 367.
90. E.g., Baker v. Collins, 29 Ill. 2d 410, 194 N.E.2d 353 (1963); Townsend v. Creekmore-
Rooney Co., 358 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1960); Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684
(1959). For other cases requiring that the lessor show the likelihood of profitability, see R.
HEMINGWAY, supra note 10, § 8.3, at 416 n.6.
91. 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
92. 114 Ark. 419, 169 S.W. 957 (1914).
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awarded a lessor damages for breach of this covenant, although an
award of damages based upon royalties which would have been forth-
coming leaves open the possibility of double recovery when the lease
is actually developed.93
As pointed out in a previous chapter, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has granted cancellation of a lease on grounds that the lessee
has "abandoned" the lease by failure to develop it.94 It is likely that
these cases are actually based upon the implied covenant for reason-
able development. In the 1914 decision Mansfield Gas Co. v. Park-
hill,9" the Arkansas Supreme Court quoted one of its earlier
decisions96 to the effect that the "implied covenant is in effect a condi-
tion upon which the lease was made; a failure or refusal to perform
that condition results in a forfeiture of the lease." 97 This language
indicates that the court was basing its decision on the implied cove-
nant, not on the lessee's abandonment.
As noted above, a lessor usually alleges breach of this covenant
after the lessee has drilled at least one producing well and is holding
the lease by production. In such a situation, if the court finds breach
of the covenant and finds that cancellation is appropriate, it is likely
to grant cancellation of the lease only as it applies to undeveloped
tracts. Such partial cancellation was the remedy in many Arkansas
decisions, including Enstar Corp. v. Crystal Oil Co.,9 Byrd v.
Bradham,99 Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 1° Nolan v. Thomas,1" 1 Smith v.
Moody,1 °2 Standard Oil Co. v. Giller, "3 Ezzell v. Oil Associates, Inc., °4
93. E.g., Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914) (limiting plaintiff's
recovery to interest on royalties which would have been forthcoming had the lessee not
breached the covenant); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031
(1928) (granting the plaintiff royalties which would have been paid had the lessee not breached
the covenant, but providing for credit to the lessee for these royalties upon actual develop-
ment); Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).
94. Wright, Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas (Chapter IV), 10 UALR L.J. 5, 34 (1987-88).
Cases cited are Zappia v. Garner, 259 Ark. 794, 536 S.W.2d 714 (1976); Millar v. Mauney, 150
Ark. 161, 234 S.W. 498 (1921); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837
(1911).
95. 114 Ark. 419, 169 S.W. 957 (1914).
96. Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
97. Mansfield Gas Co. v. Parkhill, 114 Ark. 419, 421, 169 S.W. 957, 958 (1914).
98. 294 Ark. 77, 740 S.W.2d 630 (1987).
99. 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 (1983).
100. 231 Ark. 357, 329 S.W.2d 424 (1959).
101. 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958).
102. 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W.2d 357 (1936).
103. 183 Ark. 776, 38 S.W.2d 766 (1931).
104. 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930).
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and Drummond v. Alphin. 1°5 Partial cancellation might also be an
appropriate remedy when the lessee has failed to drill to all producing
horizons. For example, in Stevenson v. Barnes116 the Arkansas
Supreme Court confirmed the chancellor's cancellation of the lease as
to all horizons below the Nacatoch sand, from which there was
production.
Conditional cancellation is certainly the least harsh remedy
against a breaching lessee, for it gives the lessee additional time to
develop and save the lease. In Poindexter v. Lion Oil Refining Co. 107
the Arkansas Supreme Court found breach of the development cove-
nant and ordered the lease cancelled unless the lessee commenced op-
erations within a reasonable time, which it found to be six months."°0
There was a similar result in Smart v. Crow 1o in which the court gave
the lessees a prescribed period of time to drill on the undeveloped
parts of the lease."' 0
One decision, Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 'I seemed to indicate that a court may determine what will
constitute a future breach of the development covenant. The lessor
sought cancellation of the undeveloped portion of the lease, but the
chancellor held that the lessee had a reasonable time in which to de-
velop and that a reasonable time would be until January 1, 1984. The
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. In a later decision, Roberson En-
terprises, Inc. v. Miller Land & Lumber Co. ,112 the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that conditional cancellation is inappropriate in absense of
a finding that the lessee is in breach of the covenant. In that case the
lessee sought cancellation of the undeveloped portions of the lease.
The chancellor found that the lessee was not in breach of the develop-
ment covenant but ordered the lessee to execute a release on February
5, 1986, unless it had begun operations or had drilled a producing
well by that date. The supreme court reversed, pointing out that the
chancellor should not have assumed that the covenant would be
breached by a certain date, as the chancellor could not have known of
conditions prevailing on the future date." 3 The court distinguished
105. 176 Ark. 1052, 4 S.W.2d 942 (1928).
106. 288 Ark. 147, 702 S.W.2d 787 (1986).
107. 205 Ark. 978, 167 S.W.2d 492 (1943).
108. Id. at 989, 167 S.W.2d at 498.
109. 220 Ark. 141, 246 S.W.2d 432 (1952).
110. Id. at 144, 246 S.W.2d at 434. The lessee had sixty days to begin drilling a well on one
tract and twenty days after completion of that well to begin a well on another tract.
111. 281 Ark. 207, 662 S.W.2d 824 (1984).
112. 287 Ark. 422, 700 S.W.2d 57 (1985).
113. Id. at 426, 700 S.W.2d at 59.
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its earlier decision in Arkansas Oil & Gas Co. v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp.,'14 pointing out that no issue was raised contesting the remedy
of conditional cancellation in that case.
4. Effect of Express Lease Covenants
Express lease covenants on development can negate the implica-
tion of an implied covenant for reasonable development, which is im-
plied only because it conforms with the parties' intent. 115
The decision in Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander" 6 confronted the
question whether an express lease covenant concerning development
supplanted the implied covenant. The lease contained a provision
that it would be forfeited if the lessee, within one year from the date of
the lease, failed to prospect and develop the leased lands or other
lands within four miles thereof. The court held that this provision
only concerned the time when operations were to commence and did
not concern when and how development was to continue. The court
reasoned that there was an implied covenant that the lessor would
"prosecute the operations with due and proper diligence after begin-
ning same."II I7 The court pointed out that to permit the lessee to keep
the lease solely on grounds that it had developed nearby property
within the one-year period would be to the detriment of the lessor
because of drainage, and that "[t]he plain purpose of the lease was
that the lessee should develop the land of the lessor." I 8 This decision
is consistent with holdings from other jurisdictions to the effect that
express provisions concerning initial development are not intended to
supplant the implied covenant of reasonable development." 9
C. Other Implied Covenants
The Arkansas Supreme Court has not decided any definitive case
on implied covenants other than the offset well covenant and the cov-
enant for reasonable development. However, this does not indicate
that the court would not find other implied covenants consistent with
the intent of the parties.
One implied covenant recognized in a few jurisdictions is for the
lessee "to refrain from acts which deplete the lands of his lessor and
114. 281 Ark. 207, 662 S.W.2d 824 (1984).
115. Again, this assumes that the covenants are implied in fact. See supra note 40.
116. 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
117. Id. at 174, 133 S.W. at 840.
118. Id.
119. E.g., Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 952 (1960).
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thus impair the value of the property." 120 This covenant would be
useful to a lessor whose lessee is draining oil or gas from the leasehold
but who cannot prove that an offset well would be profitable and thus
cannot establish breach of the offset well covenant. Arguably the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court rejected implication of this covenant when it
ruled that the standard of conduct required of the lessee is the same
whether or not the lessee is responsible for drainage from the lease-
hold.' 2' As noted above, whether the requirement of profitability of
an offset well should be eliminated, even if the lessee is responsible for
the drainage, is a matter of some debate.1
22
One leading treatise has suggested that there is an implied cove-
nant of further exploration, distinguished from the implied develop-
ment covenant. 123  According to this authority, the implied
development covenant "is concerned with additional drilling in a
proven field,"' 124 and requires the lessor to establish that additional
wells would be profitable, while the implied covenant for further ex-
ploration "deprives the lessor of the opportunity of having his land
tested for new producing horizons."'1 25 It appears that the Arkansas
cases encompass the implied exploration covenant within the develop-
ment covenant, because the Arkansas Supreme Court has not re-
quired a lessor to prove that additional development would be
profitable.
The implied covenant to market requires the lessee to market
production with due diligence and within a reasonable time.' 26 There
are no Arkansas cases specifically addressing the breach of this cove-
nant, which is almost always applied to gas, not to oil, because the
marketing of gas requires construction of pipelines and because gas
cannot be feasibly stored except underground. This covenant has par-
ticular significance in Oklahoma, where marketing is not considered
part of "production" under the habendum clause and a gas lease may
be held under the habendum clause by the mere discovery of gas in
120. Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir. 1977). See also R.R.
Bush Oil Co. v. Beverly-Lincoln Land Co., 69 Cal. App. 2d 246, 158 P.2d 754 (1945). See The
Implied Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases to Refrain from Depletory Acts, 3 UCLA L. REV. 508
(1955-56).
121. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Brunk, 160 Ark. 574, 255 S.W. 7 (1923). See supra text
accompanying notes 12-14.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
123. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, § 841.
124. Id. § 266.1.
125. Id. § 266.2.
126. Eg., Gazin v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961).
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paying quantities. 2 7 Thus, an Oklahoma gas lease may be held in the
secondary term without production if gas has been discovered in pay-
ing quantities as long as the implied covenant to market is not
breached. This is in contrast to the rule in Texas, where lawsuits on
the implied covenant to market are not as frequent as in Oklahoma
because gas must be produced, either actually or constructively (as by
payment of shut-in royalties), in order to hold the lease in the secon-
dary term under the habendum clause.I28 Thus, Texas and jurisdic-
tions following its rule will not permit a lessee to hold a lease in the
secondary term solely by diligent efforts to market within a reasonable
time. However, the implied covenant to market has importance in
these jurisdictions, and a lessee can breach it by failing to market the
gas when a market is available, 129 by failing to negotiate a price in
accordance with the prudent operator standard, 130 and by self-
dealing. '3 I
Another implied covenant, which is really a catch-all, is the cov-
enant "to use reasonable care in operations"' 132 or to "conduct opera-
tions with reasonable care and due diligence.' 1 33 According to
commentators, this covenant should afford the lessor relief for harm
caused by negligent operations, from failure to use modem recovery
techniques, and from failure to seek administrative action which
would be beneficial to the lessor.'34 There are no Arkansas cases ex-
pressly applying this covenant, although there is no reason to expect
that Arkansas would not recognize such a covenant if it were within
the intent of the parties to the lease.
127. E.g., Bristol v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955).
128. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid, 161 Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960).
129. E.g., Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 21 S.W.2d 445 (1929).
130. See Miller v. Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp., 403 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Piney
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. Supp. 957 (1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985) (finding
that lessee had met prudent operator standard).
131. E.g., Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
132. See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 10, § 8.9, at 439.
133. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, § 861.
134. See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 10, § 8.9, at 439; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 9, § 861.
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